Especially brutal, in my opinion, is the timing of the terminations in summer when job opportunities are rare or nonexistent, and when housing is at the lowest market level in six years and going lower. Since no white knight has yet appeared, I am engaging in an attempt to set forth such information as I have gained through various sources. Since I am not omniscient, I cannot verify definitively all such source materials. And, therefore, all that follows should be regarded as my opinion. Such may appear to be asserted as fact, but it is my opinion, and only that.
Essentially (though not inclusively) the doctrinal issue is between those who hold that truth can not be known with certainty and those who hold that truth can indeed be known with certainty.
Those holding the "assurance-but-not-certainty" view argue that since God alone is omniscient, He only can know anything with certainty. Mortals may not claim certainty in knowing anything. They may only be assured of knowing that they are saved. They cannot know such for a certainty. All other doctrinal positions such as the inspiration and authority of the Scriptures can not be known with certainty, only with assurance or confidence. And so on throughout the whole scope of doctrine. "Assurance," yes; "certainty" no.
Several lines of thought lead me to reject the "assurance-but-not-certainty" view (hereafter referred to as ABNOC), but I will reduce those to two: namely, (1) such a view directly denies the Scriptures, and (2) demeans and, indeed, blasphemes the person of God.
As to the first: note the use of "clearly" and "without excuse" in Romans 1:20. "For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead, so that they are without excuse." "Clearly" and "without excuse" are not fractional terms. They are all-inclusive. If one can arrive on Judgement Day and demonstrate that God's communication with humans was uncertain, then such a person would have an excuse. But the verse unequivocally asserts that such is not the case. Certainty is affirmed by "clear" and "without excuse" and no semantic maneuver can vitiate that statement. To say that the Scriptures have a lower standard that certainty is demonstrably false.
As for the argument that only God can know anything with certainty, even curbstone philosophers can readily refute such. For example, you who are reading this text now, are you conscious? All rational people respond affirmatively. The follow-on question is:"Are you certain that you are conscious?" All rational people respond affirmatively. Philosophers in the tradition of Pyrrho and Hume will try to fudge their way out, but the Reasonable Man (the common legal referent) does not, and should not, buy it. Again, when you cross the street, do you look both ways? "Of course," you say. Your action shows that you are certain that there is a real world out there. In both of these cases certainty inheres: we are certain that we are conscious and certain that we live in a real world where failing to look both ways could have disastrous consequences. We do not need to know a thing exhaustively in order to know it certainly.
As to the ABNOC view's holding that only God can know omnisciently, one can readily agree. But, as shown above, it is not always necessary to know omnisciently to know certainly. The certainty view usually adopts the time-honored Reasonable Man indubitability test of law: namely, "beyond reasonable doubt." A genuine believer may doubt his salvation, but such doubts are unreasonable if they are counter to the written Word of God.
A second reason to reject the ABNOC view is that it blasphemes the person of God. If God does not make certain the terms of entrance or avoidance of Hell, He is unfair, unjust, and unholy. You do not threaten individuals with the most weighty consequences of life in less-than-certain terms, and then consign them to endless suffering.
Imagine the outline of the contiguous United States being superimposed on the Sahara Desert (yes, in fact, it more than fits within those geographic confines). It is the task of Immortal Man to dig a 4' x 4' trench from Portland to Portland. The sand has been watered to a degree that removal of sand to that depth will not slump and cave in. Immortal Man has infinite strength, motivation, food & other physical necessities for his task. After nearly a millenium of heroic digging he has managed to arrive in Portland, Oregon. When arrives there, he learns that he must dig another trench paralleling the first one all the way back to Portland, Maine. Whereupon he is told that must do this back-and-forth activity as many times as there are grains of sand on the continental shores (the previous trench is always filled in by the wind blowing over the now sun-dried sand). And after that is done, the same activity must be done as many times as there are leaves in the Amazonian rain forest, times the number of snowflakes on the Alpine snowpack, times .... At this point, the first pico-second of eternity has not elapsed. Eternity is not a concept that humans readily envision or contemplate, but the mere thought of eternal damnation ought to lead a reasonable person to readily respond to the offer of escape. The God Who controls the whole process of entrance or escape from hell must make the terms certain if He is to be regarded as just. I do not want a salesman to merely assure me about his product: I want him to guarantee his product. Assurance is significantly different from a guarantee.
It is noteworthy, I think, that I have never seen any ABNOC advocate put a figure on the percentage of "assurance." Assurance or confidence comes in a broad semantic range and the ABNOCers seem to be careful never to suggest anything that would create vulnerability.
To say that the God of the Bible offers humans "assurance" but not "certainty" is, I think, blasphemy of the highest order. Indeed, John MacArthur pronounces those holding the uncertainty view as both arrogant and blasphemous (MacArthur, The Truth War, p. 156). He notes that Christ repeatedly indicted the Pharisees for twisting, perverting, and ignoring the Scriptures, and never excused them because of a lack of clarity or certainty in the Scriptures (p. 156). The subtitle for MacArthur's book is "Fighting for Certainty in an Age of Deception." Earlier MacArthur makes what I regard as the most salient point of his work: namely, that the central view of Postmodernism is its insistence that nothing is certain (cf. p. 12). I would heartily endorse that assertion.
And the doctrinal debate at Cedarville has now eventuated in the university's statement that endorses "assurance" but not "certainty." "Certainty" appears in the document, but it refers to the certainty of assurance. One must wonder at the wordsmithing that produced the word "certainty" to not mean "certainty of certainty." And the deliberate choice between "assurance" and "certainty" is telling as to administrative direction (the statement drafted by the faculty's committee appointed for such duty was summarily dismissed).
It appears that a significant figure in this whole debate is Professor David Mills. Two of his publications are listed below for the reader's reference. In both of them he defends factors in the Emerging Church. In the first of these he takes D.A. Carson to task for some portions of Carson's negative assessment of the movement. (Carson's work was a series of lectures given at Cedarville and later made into a book). On page 24 of that piece he objects to Carson's use of the word "certainty." The reference to the word "certainty" is not a casual thing for Mills uses most of the page to amplify his objection. Mills is not a trained linguist and it shows badly, I think, when he tries to jockey the definition of "certainty" into a for-divinity-only state. He insists that only an omniscient being can know certainly and this omniscient knowing is the modern view of the term "certainty." It would be helpful to those commenting in this manner if they would merely consult the leading lexicons of the language (the Oxford English Dictionary and Merriam-Webster's New International). Secular experts might dismiss Mill's observations as "abysmally ignorant." Christian charity would probably change that to "remarkable lacuna of unawareness." If everyone is free to use language in his own largely private lexical construction, language breaks down. The difficulty here is not small for it would end civilization as we know it.
Mills then imputes his definition of certainty (metaphysical certainty) to his opponents. But opponents do have the right to define their own terms, and their usual definition of certainty is stated as "beyond reasonable doubt." Defining your opponents' terms into a logical absurdity is much like a duelist seizing his opponent's gun and removing the hammer, and then having at him. The reasonable man might call this unfair, unethical, and lacking reciprocity. Since it obviously involves double standard (the remover does not want the other to remove his hammer), it again meets a New Testament definition of sin (Romans 2:1).
In his piece in the Criswell Theological Review MIlls again excoriates those who quest for certainty as arrogant and inherently idolatrous (p.55). And his discussion of language and meaning is carried on as if the Nostratics and Chomsky never existed. The effect is, I think, disastrously telling. Were my children still of college age, I would certainly not recommend Mills' classes.
In the dismissal process of the above-mentioned faculty members the matter of collegiality was prominent. If calling your fellow faculty members "arrogant" and "idolatrous" does not break the boundaries of collegiality, I am unaware of just where the boundaries of collegiality are located. The administrative actions of dismissal seem to involve an egregious example of double standard. And again double standard is one of the essential New Testament definitions of sin (cf. Romans 2:1).
One of my sons four-pointed at an Ivy League Institution and participated in their honors program. It didn't consist of large doses of philosophy, with excursus of off-the-reservation commentary. The program prepared him for the real world. And in financial terms he has been hugely successful (read multimillionaire). For what appear to be obvious reasons he has been approached twice about becoming a member of the board of trustees. He refused those approaches and no longer considers himself a supporter of Cedarville because of this not inconsequential controversy.
I would advise students to read MacArthur and McDowell. MacArthur's work is entitled THE TRUTH WAR (link); McDowell's volume is called IN SEARCH OF CERTAINTY (link) and both fill in the logic chain. MacArthur spends the opening chapters of his work in specific critique of Postmodernism. Those titles represent the orthodox point of view: that is, "certainty" as opposed to mere "assurance."
My evaluation of the trustees at Cedarville University uniformly regards them as dedicated, intelligent, self-sacrificing individuals. In this case, however, what is called for is a thorough knowledge of semantics and differentiation. It is not reasonable to expect that knowledge of individuals who have not been extensively trained in that area. And thus we have a University doctrinal pronouncement that chooses "assurance" to the deliberate exclusion of "certainty." Given these conditions, it would be wise on their part to revisit and revise that pronouncement. The school is, I believe, at a fundamental turning point, and such damage as may occur will not be easily remedied should it be allowed to occur.
It is the hope of many of us that Cedarville not become a casualty in the truth war by slowing sliding into a form of Postmodern belief which guts the certainty of the Gospel. Mather's Harvard, Dwight's Yale, and Edwards' Princeton should warn us that once orthodox does not mean always orthodox.
If you want to gut a contract, offer no guarantee. If you want to destroy motivation, just "assure," don't offer "certainty." If you want to destroy students' ardor and motivation, the "assurance-not-certainty" route will fulfill rational expectations. There is a semantic difference. In another formulation: " They are as similar as "lightning" and the "lightning bug."
The move to return to the historic position will not be easy for the "golden hand-cuffs" are on. Some faculty members have expressed concern that they may be dismissed on such grounds as the two mentioned at the opening of this essay. Idealism has its limits. Some trustees have children of college age and those children enjoy the benefit of free tuition. One does not readily throw away tens of thousands of dollars. But there is a transcendent matter here, and one's fidelity to Christ should outweigh one's fidelity to his pocketbook. If the wreckage is allowed to occur, it is unlikely that it would be readily undone. One is prompted to remember the old saw about "a stitch in time...."
To those saying that the whole matter is simply hairsplitting, one should note that the most devastating quarrel in early church history (Arius vs. Athanasius) turned on the single Greek letter "iota" (MacArthur, p. 109). The contest which lasted over a century was over the full divinity of Christ; here the matter is that of the whole catalog of doctrine. If I were a trustee I would carefully study, revisit and revise.
Leviticus 5:1 may be paraphrased thus: "If a wrong has been committed and it comes to issue, those witnesses who have seen or known of it must come forward to testify. If they do not come forward, they are guilty of the offense committed by others."
1. kevers.net/mills_staley_response.pdf. p. 24 (PDF)
2. Cedarville University: Truth and Certainty Statement (PDF)
3. The Criswell Theological Review (Spring 2006), 51-66.
4. "The Truth War: Fighting for Certainty in an Age of Deception," John MacArthur (2007)